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OSCE findings on Estonian e-voting

1 June, 2011
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This article is also available in:
Deutsch: OSZE: Untersuchungsergebnisse zum estnischen E-Voting


In its report of 16 May 2011, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) found Estonia's March 6 parliamentary elections, including the Internet voting, as trustworthy, although several elections monitors have pointed out a series of procedural and technical issues.

"The Riigikogu elections were conducted in an environment characterized by respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and a high degree of trust in the impartiality of the election administration. Election stakeholders expressed confidence in the overall process, including the Internet voting. Voters had an opportunity to make an informed choice among a field of candidates representing a variety of political alternatives," is ODIHR's conclusion.

However, the report expresses the belief that there is room for "improvement of the legal framework, oversight and accountability, and some technical aspects of the internet voting system." The weakest point, according to the report, is that the Estonian legislation doesn't deal with significant issues such as the situations that would allow the National Electoral Committee (NEC) to declare Internet voting invalid or the way in which the voters should become aware of the fact that they had to recast their ballots on election day.

Another point of emphasis was that none of NEC staff or members had the necessary know-how to carry out oversight procedures without strongly relying on the IT department of the Parliament and therefore, the report recommended the development of technical expertise within the committee.

Also, the results of the test made by NEC on the e-election system were not made public and therefore more transparency would be necessary. A disaster recovery plan was also recommended in the report, as the system maintenance, as performed during the elections, might create security issues.

After the elections, student Paavo Pihelgas asked in court for the invalidation of the electronic voting results claiming the software used in the electronic voting was flawed and a virus could theoretically change a vote without the voter's knowledge.

The student conducted a series of experiments with volunteers in order to prove his point. According to the law, the Supreme Court can nullify election results in case of violation of voter rights that had or may have had a significant effect on the election outcome.

As Pihelgas participated in the test wilfully, the Supreme Court's Constitutional Review Chamber decided on 21 March that his voter's rights had not been infringed as long as he had knowingly put himself into the situation where his vote hadn't reached the electoral committee web server.

Therefore, since only an established violation can lay at the basis of the nullification of the election result, a hypothetical possibility that someone's computer may have been infected with a similar type of virus without that voter's knowledge, could not constitute enough cause for nullification.

In this matter, the OSCE recommended the creation of a mechanism that would allow a voter to check whether his or her vote had been changed.

OSCE Calls for Enhancements to Internet Voting (17.05.2011)
http://news.err.ee/Sci-Tech/2cf34a80-6dfd-4764-aa67-1d2cf4ca879e

Supreme Court Rejects Last Voter Complaint (23.05.2011)
http://news.err.ee/Politics/bbb598aa-586b-4981-9f7e-88273b5a25c0

Parliamentary Elections - 6 March 2011 - OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report (16.05.2011)
http://www.osce.org/odihr/77557

 

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