The Irish Times reports about a new development regarding the e-voting system in Ireland. The Irish government invested 60 million Euro in hard- and software from Nedap/Powervote for the European elections in June 2004, but decided at the last minute to cancel the usage, after the Independent Commission on Electronic Voting concluded in an interim report: "(it) has not been able to satisfy itself as to the accuracy and secrecy of the system."

Civil liberty groups and the Labour Party have severely criticised the lack of an audit trail for the voter. The debate about e-voting in Ireland gained intensity in March 2003, when a negative security assessment was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. The assessment was carried out by the security company Zerflow at the request of the Department of the Environment and Local Government. The Irish Times reports on further controversy "when it emerged that storage of the machines, which had been purchased by former minister for the environment Martin Cullen, would cost millions every year in charges."

On 13 May 2005 the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted a declaration on human rights and Internet that was prepared by a special committee of academic experts and government representatives. According to the press release, "the declaration is the first international attempt to draw up a framework on the issue and breaks ground by up-dating the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights for the cyber-age."

Indeed the declaration contains a very reassuring confirmation of the fact that "all rights enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) remain fully valid in the Information Age and should continue to be protected regardless of new technological developments" and a firm statement that "Both the content and traffic data of electronic communications fall under the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR and should not be submitted to restrictions other than those provided for in that provision."

The Council of Europe is working on a new declaration or recommendation on human rights and internet. An ad-hoc committee of experts on the information society has been meeting for the first time in November 2004, and will have a second meeting in Strasbourg on 3 and 4 February 2005. The Council does not provide any information about the proceedings or specific members of the committee, but has recently published the terms of reference. The aim of the committee is to provide "a draft political statement on the principles and guidelines for ensuring respect for freedom of expression and opinion, for human rights and for the rule of law in the Information Society, with a view to its use as a Committee of Ministers' contribution to the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe (16-17 May 2005) and the 2005 Tunis

Six months after cancelling the use of electronic voting machines for the European elections Ireland has reached a deal with the Dutch manufacturer of the machines. The Irish government will hire a private firm, acceptable to both sides, to review the complete source code of the voting machines. Nedap, the Dutch company that manufactured the machine, will provide the code under a non-disclosure agreement. The source code will not be made public.

In March 2004 the Irish government set up the Independent Commission on Electronic Voting to review the secrecy and accuracy of the Nedap system. In its report the commission concludes "that it is not in a position to recommend with the requisite degree of confidence the use of the chosen system at elections in Ireland in June 2004". "(...) the Commission has not been able to satisfy itself as to the accuracy and secrecy of the system(...)". The report forced the government to cancel the use of the machines.

Ireland has cancelled the use of electronic voting machines for the upcoming European elections in June after an independent commission said the secrecy and accuracy of the voting could not be guaranteed. The Irish government has spent 40 million euros on voting machines from the Dutch manufacturer Nedap. The Irish opposition demands the resignation of the responsible minister for the Environment and Local Government, Martin Cullen.

There has been a fierce public debate in Ireland about the introduction of e-voting after technical experts raised concerns on the reliability of the voting machines and its software. In 2002 the Irish security firm Zerflow reviewed the Nedap machines and concluded that manipulation of the voting process was possible. Experts and civil society groups have since then pushed for an independent review of the source code and the implementation of a paper trail (Voter Verified Audit Trail). The paper trail should make it possible for voters to see the result of their voting on paper as they can't see what happens inside voting machines. The machine might display one vote to the voter and record something else internally. The paper ballot can also be used for a manual re-count if desired. The Nedap machines do not provide such a paper trail.

The Irish Labour Party is urging suspension of e-voting until major flaws are fixed. Ireland is planning to completely changeover to electronic voting in June 2004, for both local and European elections.

According to a report commissioned by the party the major defects are:

- An integrated end-to-end test of the entire system has not yet been conducted, only a partial test;

- The source code is not available, but code reviews indicate that certain formal methods have not been used to prove the accuracy of the software;

- It is possible to load the Microsoft Access database on the vote-counting computer with pre-prepared data. In addition vote information is transferred between PCs at the Count Centre on floppy discs. It would not be difficult to exchange discs.

- Unauthorised persons could produce an alternative version of the NEDAP

A coalition of technical, legal and political experts launched a campaign on 4 November to ensure that electronic voting can be trusted by voters and politicians across Europe.

Voters and candidates must be able to feel certain that voting intentions are accurately recorded. If any doubts do arise then all stake-holders must be able to verify and audit all aspects of the election. Without these protections, debacles such as the count of votes in the US presidential elections of 2000 are likely to be repeated on this side of the Atlantic. This could destroy voter trust in the electoral system and politics more widely.

Computerised voting is inherently subject to programming error, human error, equipment malfunction and malicious tampering.

15,000 Danish voters in the council of Ishoj, near Copenhagen, are invited to experiment with internet voting during the next elections for the European Parliament, in June 2004. According to the spokesperson from the European Parliament, Soren Sondergaard, the Danes aim at a high voter participation, especially among the young. 'At the same time it is cheaper and more efficient when the votes are to be counted,' he added. To overcome security concerns, the Ishoj voters will also have to pass by a 'real' ballot box to cast their votes.

In may, in a large-scale experiment during local elections in the United Kingdom 1.5 million people in 18 local council areas were able to take part in voting trials by text message, Internet, electronic kiosk and digital TV.