The OECD working party on information security and privacy have published a very informative but dry report about biometrics. The report analyses theory and practice of the following major biometric-based technologies: finger-scanning, hand geometry, facial recognition, iris scanning, retinal scanning, finger geometry, voice recognition and dynamic signature verification. A brief description of other, more obscure biometric-based technologies such as ear geometry, body odour measurement, keystroke dynamics and 'gait' recognition (specific perambulatory movement) is also provided.

Avoiding any grand statements about the desirability of some of these techniques, the report concludes: "The extent to which we are willing to incorporate statutory and policy and technological controls into these systems and technologies will determine the extent to which they will improve our quality of life; providing convenience and security or conversely, the extent to which they threaten our liberty and freedom via actual or potential surveillance and control."

EDRi member Privacy International has published an Interim Report on the link between identity cards and the prevention of terrorism. The report, the first of its kind, was initiated following attempts by the UK and Canadian governments to introduce biometric ID cards.

The report analysed the 25 countries that have been most affected by terrorism since 1986 and concluded that the presence of an ID card appears to have made no significant impact on prevention of these attacks. The report notes that while a link between identity cards and anti-terrorism is frequently suggested, the connection appears to be largely intuitive. Almost no empirical research has been undertaken to clearly establish how identity tokens can be used as a means of preventing terrorism.

The report comments: "The presence of an identity card is not recognised by analysts as a meaningful or significant component in anti-terrorism strategies. Five criteria are generally used to assess and benchmark the level of terrorist threat within a particular country: motivation of terrorists, the presence of terror groups, the scale and frequency of past attacks, efficacy of the groups in carrying out attacks, and prevention - how many attacks have been thwarted by the country".

Over forty non-governmental organisations from around the world signed an open letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on 30 March 2004.

Privacy International (an EDRI member) and the American Civil Liberties Union wrote the letter calling on the ICAO to reconsider its standards-setting on biometric travel documents.

The ICAO proposes that all passports worldwide implement RFID chips to support face-scanning, and possibly other forms of biometric data, including fingerprinting and iris scanning. This information would be collected at the national level, but then compared to and possibly stored in international databases. Already the EU has proposed to build on the idea in order to create a central register of fingerprints of all EU passport and visa holders.

The Russian government is considering a new system of personal registration for all citizens. In 2006 all Russians will be assigned a unique universal identifier. On 15 January 2004 the deputy minister of economical development Andrei Sharonov told journalists that the original proposal had been prepared by his ministry and the government supported this idea. The ID will be printed (most likely as a bar code) in all identifying documents that people obtain from government, like internal passports and driver licenses. Each person will get his/her ID after birth, the rest will get their identifiers gradually when contacting various governmental bodies.

The idea is to make all personal information (including sensitive data like income) available for easy analysis in one commonly accessible data system. Since 1996 at least 18 different government databases have been developed for voting, taxation, social security, medical, military service and other purposes. These databases are not connected with each other. With the new ID system the Russian government hopes to achieve progress in three main spheres: social and pension insurance, taxation and investigation of crimes. It is not clear yet whether all information is to be accumulated in one huge database or connected trough existing bases.

On 16 December the Dutch Lower House accepted a legal proposal to introduce compulsory identification for all persons from the age of fourteen. People unable to immediately show a valid passport, drivers license or (cheaper) identity-card risk a fine with a maximum of 2.250 Euro. Refusal will constitute a criminal offence. Every police-officer including military police, any extra-ordinary law enforcement agent and any police related supervisor/watcher may ask for proof of identity.

The biometric technique that has been selected for incorporation into the new UK national ID card has been undermined in the scientific press. New Scientist has reported that the technique of iris scanning is not as perfect and infallible as the Home Secretary (Minister of Internal Affairs) has claimed. The article alleged that the technology was prone to failure and that its success could not be guaranteed if used on a national scale.

New Scientist reported that the key problem "is the limited accuracy of biometric systems combined with the sheer number of people to be identified. The most optimistic claims for iris recognition systems are around 99 per cent accuracy - so for every 100 scans, there will be at least one false match".

"This is acceptable for relatively small databases, but the one being

Ole Sorensen, the Rapporteur for the European Parliament on two proposals for Council Regulations to include biometric identifiers into visas and ID cards, is questioning the proportionality and the adequacy of this measure to enhance security standards of EU travel documents. In a Working Document discussed at an internal meeting with the shadow rapporteurs of the political groups, Sorensen criticises the Commission and the Council for not even being able to enumerate the number of falsified visas, passports and ID cards, which still have to serve as a justification for the biometrics proposal. He recalls that visas are already well protected by numerous technical features: "a sign consisting of nine ellipses in a fan-shape, a kinegram (an optically variable mark), a logo, the appearance

Last week in the Netherlands a legal proposal became public to introduce compulsory identification for all persons from the age of fourteen. People unable to immediately show a valid passport, drivers license or (cheaper) identity-card risk a fine with a maximum of 2.250 Euro. Every police-officer including military police, any extra-ordinary law enforcement agent and any police related supervisor/watcher may ask for proof of identity. According to the explanatory statement the police must have a reasonable cause related to her task to ask for ID, but there is no need for an actual suspicion of an offence.

Dutch people currently only have partial identification requirements, for example when opening a bank account or at the workplace.